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Abstract 
The main purpose of this paper is to consider some current issues in the study of 
linguistic politeness and its relation to the notions of face and facework. These notions 
have received a myriad of different definitions in pragmatics and sociolinguistics during 
the last decades. On the basis of the examination of some definitions, it is concluded 
that the notions of politeness and face should not be equated. In addition, it is stated that 
the commonsense and the theoretical notions of politeness should be distinguished. The 
paper also briefly discusses the relationship between epistemic meanings and meanings, 
related to facework.  
1. Introduction 
Over the last three decades, ‘face’, ‘facework’ and ‘politeness’ have been 
among the most heavily debated notions in pragmatic and sociolinguistic 
research. Different kinds of theoretical models concerning these notions 
have been proposed, and usually they have been defined as abstract terms, 
directly or indirectly referring to a wide variety of social strategies for 
constructing co-operative social interaction across cultures. Cross-cultural 
work and empirical work in wide range of specific languages and cultures 
have, however, highlighted the socio-cultural variations in the 
interpretation of these kinds of terms. In recent years, arguments have been 
presented for the importance of making a clearer distinction between 
theoretical and commonsense terms in politeness research. 
This paper first reviews some current research into linguistic 
politeness and its relations to the notions of face and facework. Both the 
theoretical and lay interpretations are discussed. Secondly, the relationship 
between epistemic modality and facework is briefly considered. This 
constitutes an area which has up till now been scarcely examined from the 
cross-linguistic perspective. It is proposed that in the interpretation of the 
relationship between epistemic meanings and meanings, connected with 
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facework, the notion of power is an essential one. The implications of this 
proposal for the meaning description of epistemic expressions in different 
kinds of languages are also briefly considered. 
2. The notions of politeness and face as theoretical and as 
commonsense terms 
A large number of theoretical and empirical books and articles concerning 
linguistic politeness and/or the notion of face have been published in the 
last decades. In most of the studies, the politeness has been conceptualized 
especially as strategic conflict-avoidance or as strategic construction of co-
operative social interaction (cf. Eelen 2001: 21, Watts 2003: 47). The 
bibliography of politeness-related publications, compiled by Dufon & al. 
(1994), comprises 51 pages in small print, and a great amount of new 
research has been amassed since its publication. 
It is beyond the limits of this paper to give an exhaustive overview of 
politeness-related research. Recently, some critical and thorough overviews 
and analyses of politeness studies have been presented, for example Eelen 
(2001), Watts (2003) and Bargiela-Chiappini (2003). Much earlier, Fraser 
(1990) posited four main ways of viewing politeness in the research 
literature: the “social-norm” view, the “conversational-maxim” view, the 
“face-saving” view and the “conversational-contract” view. Eelen (2001), 
too, considers these views, but he uses partly different kinds of notions in 
comparing them and, in addition, he includes some other theoretical 
perspectives in his classification of politeness research. According to him, 
not only the notion of politeness as strategic conflict-avoidance, but also 
the notion of politeness as social indexing is universal to some extent in 
various frameworks of politeness (id., 20–29). These two notions originate 
in Kasper (1990). The idea that politeness should be understood as strategic 
conflict-avoidance can be found, for example, in the view that the basic 
social role of politeness is in its ability to function as a way of controlling 
potential aggression between interactional parties (Brown & Levinson 
1987:1), or in the views that connect politeness with smooth 
communication (Ide 1989:225, 230) or with avoiding disruption and 
maintaining the social equilibrium and friendly relations (Leech 1983:17, 
82). The idea that politeness is involved in social indexing may be 
interpreted as the idea that politeness is socially appropriate behavior and 
what is socially appropriate depends on the speaker’s social position in 
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relation to the hearer. This idea, too, appears in some form or other in most 
works on politeness. 
Rather than presenting various other possible ways of comparing 
frameworks of politeness on the basis of, for example, Eelen’s (2001) 
detailed analysis, I will now focus on briefly considering Brown & 
Levinson’s (1978, 1987) theory of politeness and work criticizing some 
fundamental assumptions of this theory. It has been the most influential 
framework of politeness so far, and it provides an important basis for the 
discussion of the notions of politeness and face in this paper. In the 
classification of Fraser (1990), Brown & Levinson’s theory represents the 
face-saving view, as it builds on Goffman’s (1967) notion of face and on 
English folk term, which ties face up with notions of being embarrassed or 
humiliated, or ‘losing face’. The face is understood as something that is 
emotionally invested, and that can be not only lost, but also maintained or 
enhanced. Brown & Levinson state that every individual has two types of 
face, positive and negative. They define positive face as the individual’s 
desire that her/his wants be appreciated in social interaction, and negative 
face as the individual’s desire for freedom of action and freedom from 
imposition. The theory assumes that most speech acts, for example 
requests, offers and compliments, inherently threaten either the hearer’s or 
the speaker’s face-wants, and that politeness is involved in redressing those 
face threatening acts (FTA). On the basis of these assumptions, three main 
strategies for performing speech acts are distinguished: positive politeness, 
negative politeness and off-record politeness. Positive politeness aims at 
supporting or enhancing the addressee’s positive face, whereas negative 
politeness aims at softening the encroachment on the addressee’s freedom 
of action or freedom from imposition. The third strategy, off-record 
politeness, means flouting one of the Gricean (1975) maxims on the 
assumption that the addressee is able to infer the intended meaning. On a 
more general level, Gricean model of Cooperative Principle is another 
building block in Brown & Levinson’s theory. 
The kind and amount of politeness that the speaker applies to a certain 
speech act is determined by the weightiness of this speech act. Speakers 
calculate the weight of their speech acts from three social variables: the 
perceived social distance between the hearer and the speaker, the perceived 
power difference between them, and the cultural ranking of the speech act. 
The latter is defined as the degree to which the FTA is perceived to be 
threatening within a specific culture. On the basis of the outcome of the 
calculation, speakers choose the appropriate type of strategy and 
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substrategy to be employed. Next, they select the appropriate linguistic 
means by which to accomplish the chosen substrategy. Different linguistic 
structures realize specific strategic choices. For example, one of the 
substrategies addressed to the hearer’s negative face is ‘Be conventionally 
indirect’, and when the speaker selects this strategy for asking to pass the 
salt, s/he may choose the structure Could you pass the salt? 
Brown & Levinson (1987) claim their politeness theory to be 
universally valid. They posit a universal Model Person with the ability to 
rationalize form communicative goals to the optimal means of achieving 
these goals. This Model Person can be seen as the embodiment of 
universally valid human social characteristics and principles of social 
reasoning (Eelen 2001:5). Brown & Levinson, however, admit that much 
cultural elaboration is expected on the level of, for example, what kinds of 
speech acts threaten face, what kinds of politeness strategies are preferred 
and what kinds of social relationships will trigger face-protective strategies. 
Most of the research into politeness since the 1987 republication of 
Brown & Levinson’s theory in book may be characterized as somehow 
related to Brown & Levinson’s theory (cf. Watts 2003: 98–99). The theory 
has been the preferred framework, for example, in empirical work on 
particular types of speech acts in a wide range of languages and cultures 
and in cross-cultural work considering the ways in which two or more 
cultures differ in their realizations of politeness. Various aspects of this 
theory have also been widely criticized. However, only sporadic attempts 
have been made to suggest alternative frameworks. 
Brown & Levinson (1987) base their theoretical assumptions on data 
from just three languages, English, Tzeltal and Tamil, and therefore the 
claim for universality may naturally be criticized. One of the central themes 
in post-Brown & Levinson research on politeness has been the universality 
versus cultural relativity of the notion of politeness, and at the heart of this 
discussion have been Brown & Levinson’s use of the term face and the 
conceptualisation of politeness as a set of rational strategies to soften the 
potentially unwelcome effects of face-threatening (cf., for example, Watts 
2003: 99–125). The notion of face has been in use as a metaphor in 
different cultures of the world for a very long time. It has metaphorically 
referred to individual qualities and/or abstract entities such as honor, 
respect, esteem and the self. Among the seminal works on the notion of 
face were Hu (1944) and Goffman (1967), who draws on Hu’s description 
of the Chinese ‘face’. Chinese scholars have interpreted Chinese notion of 
face as an essentially public and positive concept, consisting of three 
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positive face-types (Lim 1994), and as a situational construct, as firmly 
embedded in situational interpersonal relations (Ho 1994). Chinese scholars 
have also provided thorough and consistent critiques of Brown & 
Levinson’s work (see e.g. Gu 1990, Mao 1994 and Lim 1994). One of the 
major criticisms, presented by them, is that Brown & Levinson assume an 
individualistic concept of face, which is not appropriate to cultures with 
broad value tendencies in emphasizing the importance of ingroup interests 
over individual wants. They have also questioned the validity of the Brown 
& Levinson’s notion of negative face in cultures where the individual’s 
freedom of thought and action are determined by the social status that the 
individual has in the group. In a similar vein, several researchers from other 
Asian cultures, as well as from Islamic and African cultures, have criticized 
the individualistic interpretation of face and/or the validity of the notion of 
negative face in Brown & Levinson’s theory (e.g. Matsumoto 1988, Ide 
1993, Nwoye 1992; see also Watts 2003: 102–103 for further references). 
On the other hand, at least some Japanese researchers, like Fukushima 
(2002) and Takano (2005), regard both the positive and negative face as 
important in contemporary Japanese society, and especially Fukushima 
argues that the notion of Japanese face does not involve only the relations 
to others, but also the rights of individuals. 
As mentioned above, the Brown & Levinson (1987) account of 
politeness strategies has also been under discussion in politeness research. 
It has been criticized as overly pessimistic view of social interaction. For 
example, Nwoye (1992:311) states that according to the Brown & Levinson 
interpretation of politeness, ‘social interaction becomes an activity of 
continuous mutual monitoring of potential threats to the faces of the 
interactants’, and if this view were always true, it ‘could rob social 
interaction of all elements of pleasure’. Werkhofer (1992:156) argues that 
the Brown & Levinson account of politeness is essentially individualistic: it 
presents the speaker as a rational agent who at least during the generation 
of utterances is unconstrained by social considerations and is thus free to 
select egocentric, asocial and aggressive intentions. One of the major 
problems with Brown & Levinson’s model is also the setting out the 
choices open to the speakers in the form of a decision-tree through which 
they have to work their way before they can arrive at the appropriate 
utterances in which to frame the FTA (see e.g. Watts 2003:88). This kind 
of system also excludes the possibility that two or more strategies might be 
chosen at the same time. 
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 The variables of social distance, power and the degree of seriousness 
of the imposition in the Brown & Levinson framework have been a further 
contentious issue. According to Werkhofer (1992:176), the three social 
variables represent a narrow approach to social realities, as they are defined 
as static entities that determine polite meanings. This kind of approach 
neglects the dynamic aspects of social language use. 
One of the many researchers who have advocated the dynamic 
approach to describing language use in recent years is Watts (1992, 2003). 
I will now consider some main aspects of his view on politeness and face, 
since this view is essential for the further discussion of these notions in this 
paper. Throughout his book (2003), Watts argues for a radically new way 
of looking at linguistic politeness. He aims to show that it is necessary to 
make a clear distinction between the commonsense or lay notion of 
(im)politeness and the theoretical notion of (im)politeness. The need to 
make this kind of distinction is emphasized by Eelen (2001), too. The 
commonsense notion is referred by first-order (im)politeness 
((im)politeness1), and the theoretical notion is referred by second-order 
(im)politeness ((im)politeness2). Politeness1 is a socio-psychological 
notion that is used for the various ways in which members of sociocultural 
groups talk about polite language usage, whereas politeness2 is a 
theoretical, linguistic notion in a sociolinguistic theory of politeness. Watts 
(2003:1–17) states that the terms polite and politeness and their rough 
lexical equivalents in other languages may vary in the meanings and 
connotations associated with them from one group of speakers to the 
next—even from one individual speaker to the next. According to him, 
some examples of lay interpretations of polite language usage are ‘the 
language a person uses to avoid being too direct’, ‘language which displays 
respect towards or consideration for others’, or ‘language that displays 
certain “polite” formulaic utterances like please, thank you, excuse me or 
sorry’. On the other hand, some people may consider the polite use of 
language as, for example, ‘hypocritical’, ‘dishonest’ or ‘distant’. As regards 
a general level of polite behavior, some people feel that polite behavior is 
equivalent to socially correct or appropriate behavior, while others consider 
it to be the hallmark of the cultivated person etc. The purpose of Watts is to 
show that the nature of politeness1 (as well as impoliteness1) is inherently 
evaluative. He argues that (im)politeness1 is a locus of social struggle over 
discursive practices. On his view, this very fact should be the central focus 
of a theory of politeness. So, a theory of politeness2 should concern itself 
with the discursive struggle over politeness1, or in other words, over the 
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ways in which (im)polite behavior is evaluated and commented on by lay 
people. 
Watts (2003) bases his theory of politeness on Bourdieau’s (1977) 
concept of social practice and his own theory of emergent networks. Using 
data from naturally occurring English verbal interaction and his personal 
experience, he develops an argument that politeness theory can never be 
fully equated with face theory. He attempts to show that, in fact, Brown & 
Levinson (1987) change the Goffman (1967) notion of face, and he 
suggests a return to Goffman’s conceptualization of face. Goffman defines 
face as ‘the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by 
the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact’. In addition, 
it is ‘an image of self delineated in terms of approved social attributes (…)’ 
Watts states that if this conceptualization of face is accepted, we must 
accept that we are attributed face socially in accordance with the line or 
lines we have adopted for the purposes of some communicative interaction. 
This means that we can be assigned different faces on different occasions 
of verbal interaction and that all social interaction is predicated on 
individuals’ face needs, i.e. that we can never get away from negotiating 
facework. In situations in which one participant needs to take particular 
care not to damage another participant’s face, that participant will do 
everything to avoid face-threatening. This kind of facework is supportive. 
On the other hand, some situations sanction the display of face-threatening, 
i.e. aggressive facework. 
Both the supportive facework and the sanctioned aggressive facework 
lie inside the boundaries of behavior, linguistic or otherwise, that Watts 
(2003) calls politic behavior. This term is defined by him as the behavior 
which the participants construct as being appropriate to the ongoing social 
interaction. As regards the notion of politeness1, Watts presents it as being 
behavior in excess of politic behavior, which allows for much leeway with 
respect to the disputability of the notion (im)polite1. Because 
(im)politeness1 is disputable, it follows that no linguistic structures can be 
taken to be inherently polite. Watts considers a fair amount of highly 
conventionalized formulaic (e.g. thank you, please, no trouble at all) and 
semi-formulaic (e.g. Close the door, will you? Can I have another piece of 
cake? Let me help you with those bags.) expressions in English that are 
often interpreted as expressions of politeness. His aim is to demonstrate 
that at least in English, linguistic structures do not in themselves denote 
politeness. Rather, they lend themselves to individual interpretation as 
polite in instances of ongoing verbal interaction. He states that we need to 
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know something about the situation in which linguistic structures occur in 
order to evaluate whether they form part of the politic behavior of that 
situation or whether they are beyond what can be expected of it and are 
thus potentially open to interpretation by participants as polite.  
 I subscribe to the view of Watts (2003) that politeness theory and face 
theory should not be equated. Politeness as a commonsense term is a value-
laden, disputable notion, and these properties are not adequately captured 
by the theory like Brown & Levinson’s (1987) politeness theory which 
claims that politeness is involved in redressing various kinds of face-
threatening acts. However, the radically new account of linguistic 
politeness and facework, suggested by Watts, is not without problems. 
First, although the Goffman (1967) notion of face, on which Watts draws, 
is more social than Brown & Levinson’s elaboration of this notion, it has 
some distinctly individualistic traits. As Bargiela-Chiappini (2003) states in 
her careful analysis of Goffman’s notion of face, this individualistic 
emphasis appears to be woven into a socio-psychological construct of face, 
which is commonly thought to have originated in China. Therefore, it is 
questionable whether Goffman’s—and Watts’—definition of face provides 
an adequate basis for describing the use of linguistic expressions in 
facework in cultures which emphasize group identity over individual 
identity. Second, the definition of politeness1 as behavior in excess of 
politic, i.e. appropriate behavior seems to me morally involved definition, 
although this kind of definition is what Watts tries to avoid. Throughout his 
book, he argues that the notion of politeness is extremely variable, 
disputable notion among lay members of society, and one of the lay 
interpretations of politeness is appropriate behavior. Thus, the definition of 
politeness1 by Watts excludes a part of the variation in commonsense 
interpretations. However, in the end of the book, Watts (2003: 258) submits 
that in practice, certain utterances that lie within the scope of politic 
behavior may be open to interpretation as polite. I would suggest, following 
Eelen (2001: 253–256), that the notion of politeness1 is in need of further 
investigation. Different kinds of research methods should be used to 
investigate ordinary people’s notions of politeness: informal interviews or 
examples of actual politeness evaluations. The third problem in Watts’ 
theory concerns his interpretation of face as related to different occasions 
of verbal interaction. It is at least possible that there are differences 
between cultures in the degree to which face is constantly renegotiable. 
This hypothesis should be tested cross-culturally. 
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3. Further research  
Instead of summarizing the discussion in Chapter 2, I will here briefly and 
in general outlines describe the study of facework in different types of 
languages I am working on. In this study, I assume, like Watts (2003), that 
politeness and face are different kinds of notions, although they are related 
in many ways. Facework consists partly of utterances that are open to 
interpretation as polite. My discourse analysis also draws on Ting-
Toomey’s (2005) face negotiation theory. Basing her theory on extensive 
cross-cultural research, Ting-Toomey distinguishes several face content 
domains: autonomy face, inclusion face, approval face, reliability face, 
competence face, and moral face. The boundaries between face domains 
are permeable and overlapped. It seems to me that the assumption that 
facework has several possible content topics is necessary in order to 
explain the variation in facework cross-linguistically and in specific 
languages. Ting-Toomey also makes an important distinction between 
individualistic and collectivistic value tendencies. Different cultures cannot 
be simply defined as either individualistic or collectivistic, but if 
individualism versus collectivism is interpreted as a value dimension, it can 
serve as a frame in explaining why individuals differ in their face 
expectations and face concerns in different cultures. 
The focus of my study is the relationship between epistemic meanings 
and different kinds of meanings related to facework. Different types of 
languages have expressions, such as English possibly or surely, the 
prototypical meaning of which is epistemic. It is possible to describe these 
meanings by means of the values of dimensions, for example “the 
speaker’s uncertainty that P (=proposition)’ or “the speaker’s certainty that 
P”. In actual discourses, these values may be negotiated. Cross-
linguistically, it is an interesting fact that epistemic expressions are often 
used in various kinds of facework, for example in mitigating or supportive 
function. For example, a Russian parenthetical expression možet byt’ 
‘maybe’ is often used in questions in order to mitigate a request, an offer or 
a suggestion. These kinds of meanings are also described by means of 
dimensions and their values. One of the dimensions is a power-dimension, 
indicating the perceived power relations between the speaker and the 
hearer. The notion of power is understood not as static and unchanging, but 
as constantly negotiable (cf. Ng & Bradac 1993). By means of various 
kinds of epistemic expressions, it is possible to exercise power by 
mitigating the harshness of an influence message. One part of background 
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knowledge that is needed in describing the various meanings of epistemic 
expressions can be metaphorically understood as a multidimensional 
semantic space. The dimensions of the space have many connections, and 
therefore it is not always possible to make a clear distinction between, for 
example, an epistemic meaning and a mitigating meaning in actual 
discourse. Thus, in meaning categories of epistemic expressions, the 
boundaries between epistemic meanings and mitigating meanings are 
fuzzy. 
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